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ABSTRACT 
 
Availability requires that computer systems remain functioning as expected without loss 
of resources to legitimate users.  The impact of a lack of availability to services and data is often 
little more than a nuisance; however the results could be devastating if critical computational and 
communication resources are targeted.  One of the most problematic challenges to availability is 
the denial of service (DoS) attack.  Over time, DoS attacks have become increasingly 
sophisticated, often employing techniques like address spoofing, coordinated distributed sources 
of attack, and subverting “inside” computers to assist in carrying out the attack.  DoS attacks are 
very easy to launch, are effective, and are difficult to prevent or mitigate. 
The purpose of this work is to study post-mortem DoS attacks over time with the goals of 
uncovering how the attacks relate to each other, identifying the underlying vulnerability that led to 
success, and gaining insight on future attack trends.  By studying how attacks have changed over 
time and adapted to overcome new security practices, it is possible to construct attack trees to 
represent the genealogy and history of DoS attack tools.  Through code inspections and close 
analysis of the attack trees, we were able to identify core techniques copied from one attack to 
another, the synthesis of more effective techniques based on combinations of existing methods, 
and the genesis of novel attack strategies.  The generation of attack trees allows for an important 
examination of how attacks relate to one another as well as insight on the core vulnerabilities that 
still remain in modern software solutions.  More importantly, by closely analyzing the genealogy 
of attack trees and post-mortem DoS exploitation, we not only gain information on the 
methodologies currently used by attackers but also discover valuable insight on predicting future 
attack patterns as well as developing possible countermeasure. 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 In February of 2000, a series of massive 
attacks incapacitated several high-profile Internet sites, 
including Yahoo, Ebay, and E*trade.  Next, in 
Januaryof 2001, Microsoft’s name server infrastructure 
was disabled by another assault [1].  Since September 
1996, several dozen sites on the Internet have been 
subjected to similar attacks [2].  The attacks can be 
launched with little effort and are often difficult to trace 
back to the originator.   Furthermore, it is never 
necessary for the attacker to explicitly break security 
mechanisms to exploit the vulnerability.  Complex and 
strong authentication mechanisms that provide data 
confidentiality and integrity are often rendered useless 
in availability attacks since the enemy never actually 
needs to compromise the computer system security. 
 Availability requires that computer systems 
remain functioning as expected without degradation in 
processing and that resources remain accessible to 
legitimate users.  Although many organizations 
may have implemented well planned and good 
security practices in building their networks, these 
networks still remain open to common availability 
attacks.  In other words, traditionally well-
protected infrastructures suffer from vulnerabilities 
in maintaining availability.  In fact the existence of 
previous security practices and management plans 
may indeed actually make the network more 
vulnerable to attack due to the false pretense of 
immunity.   
 The primary goal of an availability attack 
is simply to deny victims access to a particular 
computer resource.  The enemy never needs to 
supply a password, secure token, or other means of 
authentication; the attacker only needs to block 
other users from accessing the system.  A denial of 
service attack is characterized by an explicit 
attempt by attackers to prevent users of a service 
from using that service [3].  For example, flooding 
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a network with traffic prevents other computing 
systems from communicating on the same network and 
thereby disrupts normal network services.  In this 
scenario the attacker simply overloads normal resources 
and effectively blocks communication.    
 Many of these assaults, otherwise known as 
denial of service (DoS) attacks, are commonly 
published on a wide variety of Internet web sites.  In 
fact many sites freely advertise and distribute easy-to-
use attack scripts.  Web-surfers, who may know little of 
the technical details of the attack, can easily download 
the scripts and launch large bombardments against 
computer networks and computer systems.  As a result, 
many attacks are easy to carry out and may even occur 
on a relatively frequent basis, simply going unreported.  
Furthermore, these assaults have grown increasingly 
more complex and effective over the past few years.  
With an increased understanding of how systems work, 
intruders have become skilled at determining 
weaknesses in systems and exploiting them [4]. As new 
security measures are implemented, new attacks begin 
to appear.   
 Various research studies have been previously 
conducted as a means of characterizing and identifying 
attacks and assault tools in hopes of developing strong 
countermeasures.  Through forensic analysis and the 
compilation of large attack databases, security 
engineers, analysts, law enforcement officials, and 
others have hoped to design processes capable of 
determining attack types as well as detecting attacks 
based on intrusion detection system signatures.  
Research conducted by Ivan Krsul [6], Peter Mell [5], 
Tom Richardson [7], and others have all focused on 
compiling vulnerabilities into databases and analyzing 
the entries for common characteristics in aim of 
building attack classification taxonomies.  For example 
Krsul describes his software vulnerability analysis as “a 
framework for the development of taxonomies 
according to generally accepted principles [that] can be 
used to develop unambiguous classifications” [6].  By 
characterizing existing threats and increasing our 
understanding of the nature of software vulnerabilities, 
software developers can hopefully improve the design 
of products to withstand such attacks in the future.    
 However, unlike those previous research 
projects aimed primarily at developing only attack and 
vulnerability taxonomies, the purpose of this project 
was not only to study how denial of service tools have 
changed over time but also develop a model that relates 
different attacks to one another as well as suggesting 
future attack strategies.  By examining DoS attack 
history, genealogy, and post-mortem evidence together, 
researchers gain the ability to not only identify existing 
attacks and possible countermeasures but possibly even 
predict future attacks in some cases as well.  Although 
attacks have grown increasingly complex over 
time, many of the same basic ideas and methods 
for performing the denial of service remain 
unchanged or only slightly modified.  While 
previous research models had focused on denial of 
service attacks as singular data points, modeling 
attacks as growing genealogical trees formed from 
several different software attacks yields valuable 
information on recurring themes in DoS attacks.  
Furthermore, attack tree hierarchies allow 
researchers the ability to study how software 
vulnerability exploits have changed, migrated, and 
increased in complexity over time.  By closely 
analyzing the evidence left after a denial of service 
assault and correlating it with current and past 
attack strategies, we gain the ability to make 
modest predictions on likely new attack scenarios 
as well as the preliminary countermeasures that can 
taken to prevent them. 
   
ATTACK TREES 
 
 Typically attack graphs serve as a formal 
model for identifying and analyzing all 
vulnerabilities for a particular host or network.  
Constructing attack graphs is a crucial part of 
doing vulnerability analysis of a network of hosts 
[8].  Because each path and node in the attack tree 
represents a slightly different means of achieving 
the desired denial of service, attack graphs assess 
the overall availability vulnerabilities of a single 
network host.  More important to this study though, 
attack trees provide a formal, methodical way of 
describing the security of systems, based on 
varying attacks [9].  In other words attack graphs 
model the means of achieving the end goal of a 
successful attack through slightly different means 
of approach.  More formally defined, 
  
An attack graph or AG is a tuple G = (S,   , 
S0, Ss) where S is a set of states,     S   S 
is a transition relation, S0   S is a set of 
initial states, and Ss   S is a set of success 
states.  Intuitively Ss denotes the set of 
states where the intruder has achieved his 
goals.  Unless otherwise stated we assume 
that the transition relation   is total.  We 
define an execution fragment as a finite 
sequence of states s0s1…sn such that (si, 
si+1)     for all 0   i < n.  An execution 
fragment with s0   S0 is an execution, and 
an execution whose final state is in Ss is 
an attack, i.e., the execution corresponds 
to a sequence of atomic attacks leading to 
the intruder’s goal state [8]. 
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In other words attack graphs are data structures used to 
model all possible avenues of attacking a network.  The 
graph offers a formal methodology for understanding 
the software vulnerability and how attacks exploit those 
vulnerabilities to achieve their goals. 
 More specific to this study however, attack 
trees are defined as the set of states that identify all 
possible means of using a particular vulnerability to 
achieve a denial of service.  Attack trees are structures 
comprised of singular nodes, or exploits, that all have 
the desired goal of causing a loss of availability.  
Unlike the general attack graph definition, attack trees 
do not outline every possible means of achieving the 
end success state.  Instead, the trees illustrate the 
evolution of a single attack over time, representing the 
single process the adversaries use to reach the goal 
state.  Unlike their attack graph counterparts, attack 
trees only represent the genealogy of an attack, or how 
the attack has shown modifications and grown in 
complexity overtime. 
 Thus each attack tree begins with a root node 
of the goal state, a complete or partial denial of service, 
and one or more leaf nodes as means of achieving that 
desired goal.  However each leaf node typically 
parented by another node which typically represents a 
more classical or conventional approach or a different 
means of conducting the same attack.  For example, 
Schneier demonstrates the basic principle using the 
scenario of a criminal wishing to open a locked safe [9].  
While there may be several means of opening the safe 
through destruction, cutting, or explosives, the criminal 
wishes to open the locked safe through a single means 
of attack by cracking the combination.  A wide 
variety of methods exist though for learning the 
combination of the safe as illustrated in Figure 1.  
It is important to note that several possible methods 
exist for conducting a single type of attack.  The 
criminal can either steal the combination through 
eavesdropping or social engineering, or the attacker 
may possibly find the written combination by some 
other method.  However, every child node stems 
from the parent attack method of cracking the 
combination.   
 Historically many of the means of 
cracking the safe can change as well.  For example, 
the criminal may gain several new automated lock-
picking kits as new technology is developed or 
changes are made to the safe design.  As a result 
the tree may grow several new child nodes that 
stem either from previous child nodes or the parent 
node itself as demonstrated in Figure 2.  Such 
historical and genealogical changes to the attack 
tree are extremely important to this research as 
they may demonstrate how vulnerabilities and 
attacks have changed over time with new software 
and hardware technology.  Even in the modified 
attack tree where new means of conducting the 
same attack have been developed, each node 
becomes a subgoal, and children of that node are 
ways to achieve that subgoal [9].  More simply, 
attack trees simply illustrate every possible 
procedure for using a specific means to launch an 
attack. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Safe Lock Attack Tree [9] 
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Figure 2.  Modified Safe Lock Attack Tree 
 
 Unfortunately, developing a genealogical 
hierarchy of attack evolution is no simple task. Building 
the attack trees requires close examination of both the 
vulnerability description, exploit source code, and in 
many cases forensic evidence.  However by building 
attack trees and studying their growth, evolution, and 
structure, researchers can determine not only likely 
methods of attack penetration but possibly predict 
future modifications to attacks as well.  Much like 
security, attack trees are a process, or methodical 
method, of describing the vulnerabilities of any system, 
accounting for those which are most likely to occur, and 
repeating the entire process in a cycle fashion. 
 
ATTACK ANALYSIS 
 
 Previous research conducted by Richardson 
defines a useful denial of service attack taxonomy for 
characterizing assault tools [7].  In order to demonstrate 
the importance of attack trees and their ability to 
accurately represent threats, we apply the model to each 
category within the taxonomy.  By analyzing attack 
trees, we gain the ability to study how vulnerabilities 
have changed over time as well as determine recurring 
themes in denial of service exploitation. 
 
Specification Weakness Attack Analysis 
 Specification weakness attacks are those in 
which the enemy attempts to take direct advantage of a 
flaw, weakness, or security vulnerability in the design 
or specification of a network, service, or 
communication protocol.  Most often these exploits 
actually attack the communication protocol, or more 
specifically the TCP/IP protocol.  Attack tools such as 
the classic SYN-Flood and LAND attacks specifically 
target weaknesses in the protocol specification.  
Because the vulnerability remains at the protocol 
specification level, the attacks are not only difficult 
to prevent since doing so requires modifications of 
an accepted and highly implanted communication 
standard, but also demonstrate many of the 
genealogical patterns of improvement and 
modification important to this study.  
 As mentioned previously, hosts 
implementing the TCP/IP protocol stack are 
limited by the number of half-open connections 
allowed on any single port at some given time.  
Unfortunately the TCP/IP protocol requires 
machine resources such as computing time and 
memory to be devoted to each of the half-open 
connections.  SYN-Flood attacks work by sending 
a targeted system a series of connection requests 
known as SYN packets. Although each packet 
causes the targeted system to issue a SYN-ACK 
response in acknowledgement to the connection 
request, the attacking system never responds to 
complete the three-way TCP connection 
handshake.  While the victim waits for the ACK 
completion that follows the SYN-ACK response 
packet, the system allocates resources to the open 
port connection request.  The resources continued 
to be allocated specifically to the incomplete 
connection process until either the attacker 
responds to complete the connection or and internal 
timer expires on the original attacker request.   
Since the attacker never responds to fully complete 
the three way TCP handshake, resources on the 
victim are quickly diminished.  Once the limit of 
half-open connection requests has been reached or 
resources no longer become available, the system 
will ignore all incoming SYN requests, making the 
system unavailable for legitimate users.   
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Figure 3. SYN-Flood Attack Tree Genealogy 
 
 Since TCP/IP does not incorporate strong 
authentication in the communication of network hosts, 
the attack is extremely successful in performing a 
remote denial of service.  Furthermore, there is a 
requirement for an inappropriately burdensome 
allocation of memory and computation resources on the 
target side [10].  Hence for an enemy attempting to 
perform a successful denial of service on a system, the 
SYN-Flood attack approach is perhaps an extremely 
effective and easy means of penetration.    
 The attack has exhibited significant 
improvements and variations since its debut several 
years ago.  Originally, forensic analysis of the SYN-
Flood attack script demonstrated a simple attempt to 
open as many incomplete connections on the victim as 
possible.  The attack was effective but inefficient.  Soon 
after examining post-mortem attack data, security 
professionals easily defeated the original exploit by 
blocking multiple incoming connection requests from a 
single host.  As the attack tree in Figure 3 demonstrates, 
the attack quickly evolved over the next few years into 
several more sophisticated attack tools that still exist as 
modern means of causing losses in network and 
resource availability.   
 Shortly following the introduction of the 
attack, the author released the more commonly used 
modern release, known as SYN-Flood 97, while others 
made the same simple modifications of the original 
attack code and released their own modified versions 
including Punk and Slice.  The new modifications 
allowed for source address spoofing that make the 
attacks even more difficult to filter since incoming 
connection requests all have different forged 
sender addresses.   
 In the next year, several more 
modifications were made to the Punk attack 
algorithm including porting the source code to Perl 
as well as revising the IP spoofing algorithm to be 
random instead of sequential.  Once again many 
security experts responded by attempting to 
analyze forged packets and filter similar bogus 
connection requests.  However the more significant 
changes to the attack came with a revision of the 
Punk attack script known as Juno.  The new TCP 
SYN-Flooding tool modified the original algorithm 
for faster packet creation and allowed the attacker 
to emulate different attacker OS platforms.  In 
other words, the new attack tools allowed for the 
possibility of more rapid attacks as well as fooling 
filtering software into determining forged packets 
had been sent by separate hosts on different 
operating systems.  Once again a short time later, 
Juno v1.01 was developed that allowed for even 
faster packet creation, better OS simulation, and 
improved random source IP generation [11].  In 
addition a separate work known as Flood2 was also 
introduced similar to the original Juno that 
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conserved network bandwidth on the part of the 
attacker by decreasing the overall packet sizes.   
 The modifications and evolutionary growth of 
the SYN-Flood attack tree demonstrates the ability of 
attackers to improve designs to not only overcome 
additional security measures implemented by 
administrators but also improve the overall efficiency 
of attacks.  Furthermore, the attack tree helps to model 
how similar attacks may appear in other software 
systems.  As attack trees grow, the leaf nodes often 
spring entirely new methods of conducting a similar 
attack on either different software systems or 
communication networks.  For example shortly after the 
SYN-Flood attack was released, several new attacks 
were developed for the Microsoft Windows platform 
that simply represented variations of the original SYN-
Flood idea that exploits the Out-of-Band data 
assumption [11].  In the case of the KillWin and 
WinNuke attacks, the enemy sender directs a special 
packet to the host with the urgent pointer set.  The 
Windows system responds by immediately allocating 
resources to the request.  However, even though the 
urgent pointer is set and the Windows system expects 
data to follow, the attacker instead continues to follow 
with more Out-of-Band data connections forcing more 
resources to be exhausted.  In fact when sent to the 
NETBIOS port, the service failed to even handle the 
requests correctly resulting in an immediate system 
crash.   
 Unfortunately, researchers may never be able 
to fully overcome the problems associated with 
specification weakness attacks since many are already 
inherently part of existing standards and intertwined 
with countless legacy network products.   However 
studying the genealogy of attack trees such as SYN-
Flood yields valuable data on how attacks have changed 
in the past to overcome new security mechanisms and 
the underlying vulnerabilities which remain to either 
still be exposed or exploited in new ways.  Since the 
publication of the SYN-Flood vulnerability multiple 
similar strategies, including LAND and other TCP-
Loopback attacks, have stemmed from the same attack 
methodology.  By analyzing themes recurrent in 
different attack trees we gain some understanding on 
both the mindset of attacker and the methodology of 
achieving denial of service. 
 
Brute Force Attack Analysis 
 Brute force attacks are those in which the 
enemy attempts to overflow or deplete computing 
system resources by some forceful and exhaustive 
means that relies on their own processing power and 
network bandwidth and the limitations of the system 
and network resources of the victim machine.  Often 
brute force attacks simply work by flooding the victim 
network or system with useless data.  Attacks such 
as Smurf, TFN2K, and Stacheldracht all act as 
extremely effective means of overwhelming the 
victim systems with vast amounts of maliciously 
crafted packets. 
 While some brute force attacks are 
simplistic and simply overwhelm the victim with 
ping requests, others demonstrate more 
sophistication and often will take advantage of 
implementation or specification weakness 
vulnerabilities as well.  For example, the Smurf 
attack targets a feature in the IP specification 
known as directed or subnet broadcasting.  By 
definition the IP protocol specification allows for 
both unicast and multicast communication 
transmissions, meaning data packets can be either 
sent to a single host or group of hosts respectively.  
In order to send a packet to multiple machines, a 
machine need only to set the receiver address to the 
broadcast address.  When a packet is sent to that IP 
broadcast address from a machine outside of the 
local network, it is broadcast to all machines on the 
target network (as long as routers are configured to 
pass along that traffic) [12].  Hence any machine is 
capable of sending broadcast messages to all 
machines on a particular local area network.  
 In order for the enemy to launch a Smurf 
attack against the network, the attacker simply 
forges ICMP echo requests using the spoofed 
sender addresser or the victim.  However, unlike a 
normal ICMP echo request the receiver address is 
set to a broadcast address.  If the routing device 
delivering traffic to those broadcast addresses 
performs the IP broadcast function, most hosts on 
that IP network will take the ICMP echo request 
and reply to it with an echo reply each, multiplying 
the traffic by the number of hosts responding [13].  
In other words, a ping request is sent to every host 
on the network with the reply address as a single 
victim.  Once the requests are received potentially 
dozens of machines then begin sending replies to 
the target system overwhelming both the network 
with useless data as well as the victim’s protocol 
stack.   
 Upon its release, the Smurf attack led to a 
denial of service of many IRC servers and their 
providers.  Although effective, the Smurf attack 
demonstrated many of the same inefficiencies as 
other previous attacks such as the SYN-Flood.  
Original attacks were blocked simply by 
preventing IP-directed broadcasts at the router or 
by disabling ICMP replies on intermediary 
machines.  However, little could be done to prevent 
the attack on behalf of the victim and as a result the  
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Figure 4.  Smurf Attack Tree Genealogy 
 
brute force attack quickly grew in sophistication as 
demonstrated in Figure 4. 
 New revisions were released months later that 
demonstrated faster packet creation by interacting 
directly with the kernel instead of normal library 
routines.  PapaSmurf and Rurf both modified the 
original attacks to grow in complexity and efficiency.  
However the most serious improvements came with 
newly revised versions of the original source code 
including Smurf v1.1 and v1.2.  Not only did the attack 
increase in speed but also built in the new capabilities 
as well.  New attack engines were capable of scanning 
for vulnerable networks as well as vulnerable 
intermediaries capable of launching the attack against 
the victim.  In fact, version 1.2 even built in 
sophisticated logging capabilities that enabled the 
attacker to build a comprehensive resource of 
vulnerable targets to help launch the denial of service.  
Finally, version 1.3 ported the attack to the Windows 
NT platform increasing the ease in which the denial of 
service attack could be launched by average users.  No 
longer did attackers need access to a UNIX or Linux 
based platform to cause a loss of availability, nor did 
they require a sophisticated knowledge on how to 
compile and launch the attack.  In just over a year, the 
attack had become a user-friendly tool capable of 
launching an extremely sophisticated attack.  
 While these analytical results may not appear 
to be entirely surprising, the research nonetheless 
demonstrates the ability of the attacker to improve the 
denial of service tools and adapt to changing security 
practices, such as filtering IP broadcast traffic at the 
router.  What is more interesting though is the fact that 
once again the attack was ported to a different platform 
soon after release.  Just as SYN-Flood had sparked a 
WinNuke attack creation, the Smurf attack was ported 
to the UDP protocol in a new attack called Fraggle.  
Much like its counterpart, the Smurf attack cousin, 
Fraggle, uses UDP echo packets in the same 
fashion as the ICMP echo packets; it was a simple 
re-write of Smurf [13].  Likewise, the Fraggle 
attack also exhibited the same revisions to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness soon after its release. 
  Much like specification weakness attacks, 
there is no means of overcoming brute force 
attacks.  By their very design, computers are 
intended to process data and output results.  By 
flooding the data input with useless information 
and overwhelming the system resources, enemies 
are able to launch quick and effective denial of 
service attacks.  Although researchers may never 
be able to fully overcome the problems associated 
with brute force attacks, studying the genealogy of 
new attack trees may help to predict future attack 
patterns such as Fraggle.  Analyzing the themes in 
attack trees and trying to predict new or missing 
branches plays an important role in both 
understanding security vulnerabilities and exploit 
efforts. 
 
Implementation Weakness Attack Analysis 
An implementation weakness attack is any 
exploitation of a hardware or software design flaw 
that directly threatens the availability of system 
resources.  In other words, the attack is an 
exploitation of security vulnerabilities in the target 
system.  Unlike the brute force and specification 
weakness attacks, implementation weakness 
attacks are often easy to repair since the 
vulnerability exists only on a certain hardware or 
software package.  Once the design implementation 
is corrected in a manner that patches the 
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vulnerability, the systems are often able to withstand 
the attacks.  However, it is important to note that this 
attack category also represents the largest portion of 
catalogued denial of service tools.  Furthermore, as the 
attack trees will demonstrate, the attack class also 
shows several recurring themes used by black hats to 
cause a loss of availability on the target systems. 
For example, in late 1997, a major problem 
was discovered in the way many vendors had 
implemented the TCP/IP protocol stack.  In order to 
accommodate networks with different maximum data 
transfer unit sizes and other limitations, the TCP 
protocol allowed for data packets to be fragmented, or 
broken into smaller pieces such that each packet contain 
a small portion of the original data unit.  When 
fragmented packets finally arrive to the receiving host, 
they are re-assembled and combined to build the 
original data set.  However, the reassembly process 
implemented by several vendors expected that 
incoming fragments of a datagram aligned neatly in a 
way that data at the start of one fragment immediately 
follows the end of the data set in the preceding 
fragment.   Of course, normally fragmented packets do 
arrive neatly and reassemble as expected, but the 
Teardrop attack deliberately crafted packet fragments to 
cause reassembly problems. 
Normally as new fragmented packets arrived, 
TCP implementations would calculate the amount of 
memory to allocate to the new packet by taking the 
difference between the end pointer of the newly arrived 
packet and the offset of the previous packet according 
to the Figure 5.  Hence under normal reassembly 
procedures, the packets align neatly without spaces or 
overlaps.  However, the Teardrop attack works by 
sending the victim specially crafted packets such that 
the calculated value for the new end pointer is actually 
less than the previous offset pointer.  This can be 
achieved by ensuring that the second fragment specifies 
 
 
Figure 5. TCP Fragment Re-Assembly [14] 
 
a fragment offset that resides within the data portion of 
the first fragment and has a length such that the end of 
the data carried by the second fragment is short enough 
to fit within the length specified by the first fragment 
[14].  Although the TCP specification does not allow 
for this problem to occur, the data packets are not 
properly validated by the TCP stack implementations 
on the victim machines.   
 As a result, the implementation module 
performing the memory allocation for the newly arrived 
packet attempts to copy the data into a buffer 
already assigned to the previous packet.  
Furthermore, the new total calculated length of the 
combined data packets actually returns a negative 
size value.  Since the implementations expect an 
unsigned integer, the negative size value is actually 
interpreted as a very large positive integer value 
[14].  Upon such requests, most TCP 
implementations would either fail due to stack 
corruption or cause a complete system halt and in 
both cases allowing the attacker to achieve the goal 
state of denial of service. 
 Again much like the SYN-Flood and 
Smurf attacks, the Teardrop attack originally 
appeared as an attack script to launch from Linux 
and UNIX hosts.  Unfortunately, unlike other 
denial of service attacks, the Teardrop could not be 
easily filtered by firewalls and other Internet 
gateways since fragments are only reassembled by 
the intended end receiver.  Protection against the 
attack was reliant upon the victims to patch the 
appropriate software and firmware vulnerabilities 
on the affected machines.  In the meantime as 
original software patches were issued by vendors to 
correct the problem, the Teardrop attack grew 
rapidly in sophistication as shown in Figure 6. 
Originally the Teardrop attack had been 
coded as a proof-of-concept exploit.  In other 
words, the original tool was a simple script to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack as a 
denial of service as well as a means of testing 
vulnerable systems.  The attack was quickly 
modified though to produce a spoofed source 
address to help hide enemy identification.  
Eventually the attack also implemented smaller 
padding sizes for the first packet as well in order to 
reduce the overall payload size and increase the 
overall attack efficiency.  In addition, tools such as 
Teardrop2 implemented faked UDP data lengths as 
a means of beginning to attack multiple protocol 
stacks on the victim machine as well as porting the 
same attack to a new platform. 
 Perhaps more interesting though is the 
Bonk branch of the Teardrop attack tree.  Soon 
after vendors issued patches to repair the original 
Teardrop vulnerabilities, the black hats responded 
by varying the original attack slightly.  Instead of 
setting the fragment offset to point to a memory 
segment already occupied by another data packet, 
the fragment offset is set to point to a location far 
beyond the end of the data packet.  The Bonk 
attack causes the target machine to reassemble a 
packet that is too large to be reassembled thereby 
causing a fault in the network stack [15].  As 
vendors scrambled to once again prevent the newly 
discovered attack, many administrators began to  
9 
 
  
 
 
Figure 6.  Teardrop Attack Tree Analysis 
 
 
prevent the attacks by preventing access to the specific 
port the Bonk tool attempted to exploit.  Shortly after, 
Boink was released to allow attackers to specify port 
ranges, scan vulnerable hosts, and improve the speed at 
which malicious packets could be generated. 
 To make matters worse, several other IP 
fragmentation denial of service exploits exhibit the 
same themes in the attack trees.  For example the Ping-
of-Death attack originally published in 1996 continued 
to be used in several other forms, most notably Jolt and 
SSPing, over the course of the next few years while 
vendors continued to make the same mistakes in design 
of the ICMP fragment reassembly implementations and 
attackers continued to use the same methods of 
improving attack efficiency and effectiveness.   
Studying the genealogy of this tree and comparing it to 
other similar attacks yields valuable information on 
recurring patterns in software vulnerabilities as well as 
exploitation scenarios. 
 
ATTACK TREE TRENDS 
 
 Although several key attack trees have been 
discussed individually, several more key important 
themes portrayed in the graphs have not been discussed.  
In addition to growing in sophistication and complexity, 
many identified attacks demonstrate other genealogical 
growth as well.  For example most of the attacks 
discussed thus far were published between 1996 and 
1998.  However, in 1998 important new attack ideas 
began to surface that heavily borrowed from successful 
denial of service exploits to date.  Both attack 
generators and distributed tools demonstrated the 
continued growth of attacks in complexity as well as 
hierarchically.   
 
Growth in Sophistication 
 As nearly every attack taxonomy 
demonstrates, exploits grow in sophistication over 
time.  In the most simplistic model attack trees, an 
implementation weakness is discovered and an 
attack is published which effectively exploits the 
vulnerability to cause a denial of service.  After the 
attack is published, other malicious code authors 
borrow from the original idea and, more often, the 
source code to make improvements.  These 
improvements typically include building a 
friendlier attack interface, making the attack easier 
to use, increasing the attack effectiveness, or in 
some case modifying the attack to continue to 
function on patched systems.   
For example, the Trash denial of service 
exploit was originally released as a simple tool 
capable of generating spoofed ICMP packets with 
random error codes and types.  Because the ICMP 
specification had not been correctly implemented 
on the Windows operating system, the spoofed 
ICMP packets often caused a complete system 
failure.  A few months later after the vendor had 
taken the appropriate steps to repair the 
vulnerability, Trash2 was released which 
incorporated new improvements in attack 
efficiency as well as demonstrate the ability to now 
generate IGMP packets as well.  Both 
improvements may have arguably been predicted 
by security researchers though the study of similar 
attack trees and their growth. 
Likewise, exploit tools are often soon 
ported to either different target or attacker 
platforms after their initial release.  For example, 
the implementation weakness taxonomy 
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demonstrated a popular attack known as Teardrop.  
Over the course of nearly a year, the Teardrop attack 
spawned several other important exploits.  However 
while the original teardrop attack focused primarily on 
attacking MS Windows systems, a newly developed 
attack known as Nestea used the same idea to attack 
Linux, PalmOS, HP JetDirect Cards, and several other 
popular platforms.    
 In any case, many attack trees demonstrate a 
growth in sophistication, complexity, as well as 
versatility in very short time periods.  Given the 
common themes demonstrated specifically in the 
implementation weakness trees, vendors, software 
programmers, and engineers should not only be 
analyzing their own products and computing systems 
for undiscovered vulnerabilities to improve overall 
security but may also benefit from analyzing the attacks 
currently being used against other products as well.  By 
studying how a specific attack is being used against one 
platform, researchers may indeed be able to test the 
attack on other systems as well and more importantly 
predict possible changes in the attack that may 
overcome the newly issued system patches. 
 
Attack Generators 
 In every attack category, exploits grew rapidly 
in sophistication.  Unfortunately, as several important 
implementation and specification weakness attacks 
were being published throughout 1996 to 1998, many 
malicious coders began to build automated attack tools 
that simply borrowed from each of the previous 
effective attack ideas.  The new tools, often called 
attack generators or aggressors, once again showed a 
growth in complexity and sophistication but little in the 
way of efficiency. 
 New attack generator tools exhibited two 
important themes: combination of old attacks and 
randomization of new exploitation efforts.  Early attack 
generators were often simply a conglomeration of older 
and previously published attacks.  In other words the 
next logical step for attackers was to combine multiple 
denial of service exploits into one tool using simple 
Unix shell scripts [16].  For example the popular Targa 
attack generator relied on eight already released attacks 
as shown in the attack tree in Figure 9. In this case the 
Targa attack was simply a new interface to several 
effective attacks, making it multi-platform and 
extremely effective at causing resource loss on various 
target systems.   
Since many attackers did not completely 
understand the vulnerabilities that made the attacks 
possible nor the specific platforms the vulnerability 
existed on, the Targa attack probably appeared as an 
even more alluring tool for launching a denial of 
service. A tool like this has the advantage of allowing 
an attacker to give a single IP address and have 
multiple attacks be launched increasing the 
probability of successful attack [16].  While this 
particular feature of Targa and other attack 
generators arguably made the new denial of service 
tools easier to use and more likely to be abused by 
those without a strong working knowledge of 
security, the combination of attacks did result in 
losses of efficiency on behalf of the attacker.  
Using tools such as Targa, the enemy now had to 
launch several completely different types of attacks 
against an opposing system of which few, if any, 
the target may have been vulnerable to.   
 To make matters worse for the attacker, 
many of the new generators began to incorporate 
every version of a single attack.  Instead of simply 
including the newest revision of the SYN-Flood or 
Teardrop attack, even the malicious coders 
developing the attack generators demonstrate little 
knowledge on the how each individual script 
actually functions and what vulnerabilities it 
exploits.  For example, DataPool was released as 
several different versions, the latest of which 
includes both Nestea and Nestea2 as well as Bonk 
and Boink.  Hence the combination of old exploits 
in attack generators often leads to severe efficiency 
penalties as the same attacks are continuously 
repeated in several different fashions. 
 On the other hand, many attack generators 
exhibit an attempt on behalf of the source code 
author to possibly uncover new vulnerabilities and 
attacks by randomizing the denial of service effort.  
For example, another attack generator known as 
Aggressor as well as the forth and final release of 
Targa, both generate useless TCP/IP packets with 
random invalid fragmentation sizes, window sizes, 
lengths, types,  and other unusual characteristics in 
attempt to discover unreported specification or 
implementation weakness attacks.  Fortunately in 
most cases, these attack generators alone remain 
far from being efficient or effective. 
 Attack generators demonstrate both the 
ease of use of new exploit tools as well as their 
reduction in overall efficiency.  Nonetheless, the 
models demonstrate the importance once again of 
recognizing vulnerabilities that have already been 
discovered on other platforms and ensuring the 
proper safeguards are implemented for any system 
under one’s own direction.  As attacks are 
combined and randomly launched against 
unsuspecting hosts, the victims become susceptible 
to a wide variety of possibly unpublished 
vulnerabilities on the target platform. 
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Figure 9.  Targa Attack Tree 
 
 
Distributed Attacks 
 Perhaps the most disturbing trend in the 
growth of attack trees is the combination, automation, 
and distribution of denial of service tools.  Although it 
was not entirely possible to prevent specification 
weakness and brute force attacks, most Internet hosts 
increased in network bandwidth, processing power, as 
well as memory resources to a point where it became 
difficult for a single attacker to overwhelm the target 
system with enough data that it would be unable to 
respond to other legitimate requests.  As previous attack 
methods began to meet their limits in less than two 
years, the next logical step was taken to combine the 
power of a number of multiple systems into a 
distributed denial of service cluster [16].  In 1999, 
several new attack tools were published that combined 
the strengths of both specification weakness and brute 
force exploits in a new coordinated and distributed 
denial of service interface. 
 By installing denial of service attack 
clients on multiple compromised systems and 
developing a hierarchy of control such that all 
clients could be issued commands from a central 
location, attackers could now launch their attack 
from multiple hosts.  The first two tools to appear 
once again borrowed heavily from previously 
published attack tools.  For example, Trinoo simply 
coordinated a simplistic UDP flood.  By 
coordinating an attack by several dozen client hosts 
each generating literally hundreds of UDP 
datagrams, the attacker could now overcome the 
limitations of previous attacks by brute force 
means.   
 Hence many of the attack trees previously 
discussed spawned new nodes that demonstrated 
both the automation and distribution of new tools.  
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Previous attack tools were quickly modified to 
incorporate attack distribution.  For example, Targa was 
modified to create Tribe Flood Network, or TFN.  
Much like its Targa cousin, TFN supports ICMP flood, 
UDP flood, SYN-Flood, and Smurf style attacks [17].  
In addition other attacks quickly demonstrated growth 
in sophistication once again incorporating encryption 
and other stealth techniques to evade capture and 
removal of clients. 
More importantly, the attack trees now 
exhibited nodes that were arguably part of both the 
brute force and specification weakness category 
according to the original taxonomy.  Distributed denial 
of service attacks signify a major change in overcoming 
the previous resource limitations of the attacker.  Since 
the power of many is greater than the power of few, 
coordinated and simultaneous malicious actions by 
some participants can always be detrimental to others if 
the resources of the attacker are greater than the 
resources of the victim [18].  New distributed attacks 
simply brute forced many of the previously successful 
attack strategies.  Since intelligence and resources were 
no longer located on the same network, both bandwidth 
and computing resources were conserved on the part of 
the attacker.   
Although the distributed attack tree branch 
may have been somewhat hard to predict given earlier 
models, many of the future branches of the distributed 
denial of service attack nodes may not be as necessarily 
as hard to predict.  For example, soon after the release 
of Trinoo and TFN, Stacheldracht and TFN2K appeared 
incorporating new methods of encrypting client and 
attacker communications to ensure that information 
remain hidden and to prevent normal session hijacking.  
In addition both attacks modified the original attack 
algorithms once again for a slight improvement in 
efficiency.  Just as previous attack trees demonstrated 
incorporation of other attacks, scanning tools, and other 
features, the new distributed attack tools may soon 
begin to exhibit the same characteristics as well. 
 
COUNTERMEASURES AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 While several measures currently exist as 
means of helping to mitigate the effects of denial of 
service attacks including load balancing, resource 
throttling, attack detection, containment, and filtering, 
there currently exists no full solution for entirely 
protecting a system against the threat of loss of 
availability.  For example, CERT and several security 
vendors all advise several appropriate measures a 
vulnerable host can take in order to help prepare and 
withstand such an attack.  However, given the 
specification weaknesses in widely used 
communication protocols such as TCP/IP and the 
inherent vulnerabilities of any host to a brute force 
attack, no formidable solution may exist in the near 
future that will entire protect systems from denial 
of service attacks. 
 In computer and network security, very 
few solutions actually exist though that entirely 
prevent many types of attacks.  Instead security is 
an ongoing process of risk assessment.  Improving 
the security of a system requires the users to 
determine where the current vulnerabilities exist, 
which are most likely to be exploited, and which 
represent the greatest risk.  Fortunately, attack trees 
provide a formal methodology for analyzing the 
security of systems and subsystems [9].  In other 
words, attack trees form a groundwork for 
understanding the process of improving security. 
 Typically attack graphs are used by 
security professionals in order to determine every 
possible means of penetrating a vulnerable system.  
By trying to determine every method of obtaining 
the attack goal, security engineers and network 
administrators can then determine which nodes in 
the tree have the least cost to the attacker in terms 
of both time and dollars, require the least skill on 
behalf of the attacker, and are the most easily 
accomplished.  By sending appropriate values to 
each node, administrators can often determine 
likely paths of system penetration and the possible 
attack scenarios for an enemy to successfully reach 
the final goal.   
 Much like their attack graph counterparts, 
genealogical attack trees demonstrate possible 
scenarios for achieving some type of attack such as 
a denial of service.  More importantly though, 
attack trees represent the path that malicious users 
have already taken in order to successfully achieve 
a goal.  The genealogical hierarchy of an attack 
tree portrays not only how attacks have changed 
over time but also how they have not changed.  As 
demonstrated by the Teardrop attack tree, several 
important paths of attacking vulnerable 
implementations of the TCP/IP protocol stack 
existed.  However, at the time the initial software 
patches were released only one particular method 
of attack was currently being used by the enemy.  
Soon afterwards as the attack started to become 
ineffective against many repaired target machines, 
a new branch of the attack tree spawned which 
exploited the same fragmentation vulnerability as 
before by simply another means.  
 Studying the genealogy of the 
fragmentation exploits and other implementation 
weakness attack trees, software designers and 
forensic analysts can potentially determine what 
other undiscovered vulnerabilities may exist.  For 
example, had software designers fully analyzed the 
current attack tree structure of the Teardrop attack 
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and the corresponding post-mortem attack data they 
may indeed have noticed other branches within the 
attack tree that were currently missing as part of the 
hierarchy.  In other words, existing attack trees can be 
analyzed in conjunction with forensic data by software 
engineers as a methodical approach of attempting to 
determine other future methods of attack, likelihood of 
exploitation, and possible new attack trends.  By 
analyzing the current structure and genealogy of the 
tree and attempting to determine currently missing 
branches, designers gain a valuable tool in helping to 
prevent future vulnerabilities.  Just as administrators 
and security engineers use attack graphs as a 
methodical approach to representing important risks 
currently exhibited by a computing system, attack trees 
can be used by forensic analysts and patch developers 
to help determine new attack trends and software 
vulnerabilities. 
 Software vulnerabilities exist because it is 
impossible for designers to produce systems which 
conform to extremely strict security standards without 
formal proofs and validation of the source code.  
Although many designers take careful steps to prevent 
software vulnerabilities, vendors simply can not predict 
what flaws will later be discovered.  Thus attack trees 
became an extremely important mechanism for building 
more secure software.  Should designers analyze the 
current attack against the system using a more 
methodical approach and determine other likely 
methods of attack as well as existing attack 
improvements, they may indeed uncover other 
vulnerabilities that would otherwise not be noted until 
later. 
 In addition, attack trees provide an effective 
means for other vendors to determine whether their 
products are currently vulnerable to attacks being 
launched on other platforms.  Several of the attack trees 
demonstrated that attackers later ported the attack to a 
wide variety of other platforms each of which was also 
susceptible to risk.  Attack trees provide a way to think 
about security, to capture and reuse expertise about 
security, and to respond to changes in security [9].  
Given many of the common themes demonstrated in the 
implementation weakness trees, engineers may be able 
to gain valuable information on undiscovered 
vulnerabilities in their own software designs simply by 
analyzing the attacks currently being used against other 
products.  By studying how a specific attack is 
being leveraged against one particular software 
application, researchers may indeed be able to test 
the attack on other systems as well.  More 
importantly researchers may gain the ability to 
predict possible changes in the attack that could 
possibly overcome the newly issued system 
patches. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 As the connectivity of modern computers 
continues to increase and Internet infrastructure 
continues to expand, the importance of maintaining 
the availability of network and computing 
resources has become an extremely important and 
challenging task.  Recent distributed denial of 
service attacks demonstrate the serious 
vulnerabilities that still remain within much of the 
world’s electronic communication system and the 
crippling effects of simple to sophisticated attack 
agents.  Although no absolute countermeasure 
against the attacks currently exists, analyzing the 
patterns, themes, and genealogical growth of 
current attacks yields valuable information on 
existing software vulnerabilities and possible future 
attack trends.   
 By examining denial of service attack 
trees coupled with forensic evidence of the attacks, 
researchers gain the ability to not only identify 
existing attacks and possible partial 
countermeasures but possibly even predict future 
attacks in some cases as well.  Although attacks 
have grown increasingly complex over time, many 
of the same basic ideas and methods for 
performing the attack remain unchanged or only 
slightly modified.  Many of the same attack themes 
that have been uncovered in the past are 
reappearing in new forms which target different 
software platforms, improve attack efficiency, or 
distribute the attack among multiple hosts. By 
studying the genealogy of existing attack tools and 
their hierarchical structure coupled with post-
mortem analysis, researchers are afforded the 
ability to study how software vulnerability exploits 
have changed and migrated over time.   
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